Immigration Review

Ep. 319 - Precedential Decisions: 6/1/2026 - 06/7/2026 (PSG - must consider all claims, family, nationwide social distinction; crime of child abuse; mandatory detention; discretion & crimes; particularly serious crime; AI sanctions; equitable tolling)

• Kevin A. Gregg, Esq.

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Alvarado-Paz v. Blanche, No. 25-1119 (4th Cir. June 1, 2026)

  • nexus; BIA missing particular social groups; Salvadoran women; substantial evidence review; CAT assessment; asserting correct particular social groups before IJ

 


Uddin v. Blanche, No. 24-1067 (4th Cir. June 5, 2026)

  • crime of child abuse; INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i); sexual images of children on filing sharing platform; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a)(iii); review of criminal elements at time of actions and not conviction

 


Matter of N-A-G-C-, 29 I&N Dec 662 (BIA 2026)

  • mandatory detention; SIJ; Hurtado

 


Matter of Mills, 29 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 2026)

  • LPR cancellation of removal; discretionary balancing of factors; criminal history; longtime residence; crimes against persons; going behind record of conviction 

 


Matter of J-O-A-, 29 I&N Dec 672 (BIA 2026)

  • particularly serious crime and fraud or deceit; health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347; N-A-M- analysis; kidnapping CAT; Nigeria

 


Matter of S-E-M-Z-, 29 I&N Dec 680 (BIA 2026)

  • nationwide social distinction; family-based particular social group; gang recruitment; but-for nexus standard

 


Perez-Castillo v. Blanche, No. 25-1988 (7th Cir. June 1, 2026)

  • AI use in legal briefs; sanctioning attorneys; contract attorneys; ghost writing fake citations; battery in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1); crime of domestic violence; hardship; waiving  dispositive argument

 


Lnu, et al. v. Blanche, No. 24-4790 (9th Cir. June 3, 2026)

  • AI use in legal briefs; sanctioning attorneys; contract attorneys; ghost writing fake citations; candor to the court

 


Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche, No. 25-9552 (10th Cir. June 1, 2026)

  • untimely motion to reopen; equitable tolling; diligence; new evidence in affidavit; extraordinary circumstances; BIA reasoned decision making requirement 

 


Muchiri v. Blanche, No. 25-1340 (1st Cir. June 3, 2026)

  • BIA failure to consider arguments; ethnicity; family-status claims; Mungiki; Kenya




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SPEAKER_00

Welcome to Immigration Review, your weekly source for immigration case law updates and insights. I'm your host, Kevin A. Gregg, a partner at the Immigration, Medical Malpractice, and Business Litigation Law Firm Kurzban, Kurzban, Tetzelli, and Pratt. Back again to review the week's precedential immigration cases, rummaging through the decisions so you don't have to. This podcast is sponsored by Serenade Ke Immigration. If your caseload is growing, you've probably felt this. At some point, more cases start to mean more chaos or more hiring. But it doesn't have to work that way. There's a really good guide on immigration case management that shows how better systems and workflows can actually increase your capacity without just adding more people. It covers everything from data consistency to client communication. And it's totally free for immigration review podcast listeners. Get this and tons of other free resources at get.immigration.com forward slash IRP or click on the special link in the show notes. This podcast is also sponsored by Gonzalez and Gonzalez Immigration Bonds. Immigration Attorneys. Once you've secured a bond, let Gonzalez Gonzalez take it from there. In business and family-owned for 75 years, Gonzalez ⁇ Gonzalez helps other families post immigration bonds quickly, easily, and with full support every step of the way. Sure, you can post directly with DHS, but that means no guidance, no help when something goes wrong, and a four to six month wait for a refund. With Gonzalez and Gonzalez, families get hands-on help throughout the entire process and typically get refunds within one to two weeks of receiving the I-391 notice. Tired of being the point of contact for every bond question? Let Gonzalez and Gonzalez take those calls. They'll handle the paperwork, the system issues, and the family's concerns so you can focus on what really matters: winning the case and helping your clients stay in the country.

SPEAKER_01

You can reach Gonzalez and Gonzalez at 833-409-9200. Their fee?

SPEAKER_00

Financing options? They've got those too. Give Gonzalez and Gonzalez a call, check them out at immigrationbond.com or click on their special link in the show notes. And as always, this show does not constitute legal advice and is intended to keep you up to date and enable you, my dear colleagues, to excel in court. So, without further ado, let's start the review.

SPEAKER_01

Hello, wonderful people. Welcome to another episode of Immigration Review. There are like a million cases this week, and I am traveling, so I will try to be short at this top of the episode. But first, before I do, just want to let you know about Arena Rostova's EB5 training workshop on Tuesday, June 16th before the Alain National Conference. Check it out, look for it. Cool stuff. And there's a lot of cool things going on in the immigration bar in the days before, during, and after the National Conference. I'm very excited to see everybody in my hometown of San Diego. Find me, talk to me, and let's hang out. By the way, if you don't plan already, go see the La Jolla Seals. They're awesome. Before getting to the cases, there's other cases this week. The Supreme Court issued a short decision, for example, sending the long-pending immigration judges' union lawsuit back to the Fourth Circuit, based on a belief that the Fourth Circuit reached an issue that the parties hadn't raised. Justices Thomas and Barron would vacate the Fourth Circuit on the merits already, but I guess the fight continues. Also, the Second Circuit amended its episode 307, Sofianne B. Bondi decision about the material support of terrorism and procedural requirements. But it is essentially the same decision, it seems. You tell me, Second Circuit practitioners. And with that housekeeping, here are your many, many, many, many decisions this week.

Alvarado-Paz v. Blanche, No. 25-1119 (4th Cir. June 1, 2026)

SPEAKER_01

This case is primarily about motions to reopen. Miss Buckley is from Columbia. She overstayed her visa but sought to adjust to LPR status in immigration court. In the past, that wasn't such an extraordinary ask. The petitioner was her adult U.S. citizen son, so no bona fide relationship issue possible either. She's actually been in the United States intermittently since 1989, well before her married name became Buckley. She came for good in 2005. All legal entries before that, too, it seems. Seems like the problem began in 2009, when Miss Buckley, quote, found marijuana in her then 16-year-old daughter's backpack. Miss Buckley became nervous and angry and then questioned her daughter about the marijuana. In response, her daughter became very rude, which led Miss Buckley to strike her daughter with the non-metal end of a dog leash. End quote. For that, she got arrested for assault and battery, and an assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Come on, guys, a dangerous weapon? Seems like her first husband, with whom she was going through a divorce at the time, may have been the reason that the cops were cold. And everything got dismissed. She also has a shoplifting arrest from like 30 years ago that was for about $100 and was also dismissed. She married a U.S. citizen, her second husband later. She lives with him in Massachusetts, quote, and works for a laboratory that makes insulin for hospitals and clinics. End quote. An immigration judge denied adjustment of status as a matter of discretion in 2022, calling what I just explained above, quote, serious criminal acts, end quote. Seems like the IJ didn't like how Miss Buckley was testifying, to be honest. Even though the arrests were old and didn't lead to conviction, the IG thought maybe that she'd do it again. I don't know. Not enough remorse for the IJ, it appears. Counsel appealed to the BIA, said that they'd file a brief in their notice of appeal, but missed their deadline by about a month. So the BIA dismissed the appeal. Very rough. Council fell on their sword when they caught it like a month later. Seems like it was all the results of a calendaring error. The BIA denied the motion to accept the untimely brief without explanation. That then required a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of Council. Man, immigration representation can be brutal. In the follow-up motion to reopen, Miss Buckley explained how she complied with Matter of Lazara. The BIA denied that motion too, and that's now before the First Circuit, along with the adjustment of status denial in chiefs. First, the First Circuit affirmed denial of adjustment of status because, yes, indeed, Miss Buckley failed to file a brief as she said she would in her notice of appeal through counsel. That means that the only argument before the First Circuit came from the notice of appeal itself on the adjustment denial. And that apparently only included one substantive sentence. That, quote, the IJ had abused her discretion by not adequately balancing the positive and negative equities when denying adjustment of status. End quote. Somewhat unclear whether that's all that's in the notice of appeal, or whether that's simply the only part that's relevant, but I don't know, regardless. IA section 242 A2BI and Patel from the Supreme Court to the First Circuit stand for the proposition that circuits can't review discretionary denials of adjustment of status. Circuits can review legal or constitutional arguments, but this one sentence doesn't suffice for that. So that's that. And recall, this is the only sentence providing legal argument on the adjustment denial because it's from the initial notice of appeal, which is never that detailed. And Miss Buckley's counsel mistakenly failed to timely file her brief, so those arguments aren't being considered. But that's what motions to reopen can be for. The First Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion in denying that. The rationales relied on the BIA to deny the motion to reopen, or that Miss Buckley's one, failure to comply with the Lazarus requirements, two, failure to establish that her counsel's ineffectiveness caused her prejudice, and three, failure to provide the BIA with a copy of her brief when filing her motion to reopen. Those are the three things the BIA relied on to deny the motion to reopen. The First Circuit isn't down with any of them. First, matter of Lazara. The First Circuit has affirmed that horrendous decision in the past. Quote, under the framework, the non citizen must provide an affidavit setting forth in reasonable detail the nature and scope of the work that council undertook, an account of counsel's error, proof that counsel

Uddin v. Blanche, No. 24-1067 (4th Cir. June 5, 2026)

SPEAKER_01

was informed of the allegations and that there was an opportunity to respond, and evidence that the non-citizen filed a complaint with the appropriate disciplinary authority or possesses a legitimate excuse for not doing so. End quote. That final element is a truly rough one, not found anywhere else in law, and that has led immigration attorneys to suffer panic attacks, leave the bar, and in tragic cases take their own lives. Still, Matter of Lazada has been affirmed by all the circuits. I believe it's an old decision. But how much compliance is required with Matter of Lazada? That's often the dispute. And really, is a bar complaint required? Here, Miss Buckley provided an affidavit that apparently covered most of Lazada. The First Circuit requires only, quote, substantial compliance, end quote, rather than strict compliance with Matter of Lazata, it seems. Check me on it, guys. The VIA held that Miss Buckley failed to do that, that is, substantially comply with Lazada, but didn't explain why. The First Circuit's gonna need more on that. No bar complaint filed, but also I guess not always required in the First Circuit. By the way, it turns out that it's been the same law firm all along. The law firm is essentially lazadaing itself, albeit one attorney against another one in the same firm. This is what BIA precedent has come to require. And what is an essentially self-lizada might not be allowed in the First Circuit, mentions the court in a footnote, but well, the BIA didn't rely on that, so the court's not going to do the BIA's work for it. Remand. Moreover, explains the First Circuit, responding to some of Oyle's arguments, the court expects that the BIA will not rely on semantics or slightly incorrect word choice used by non-citizens to deny their otherwise worthy motions to reopen. As may have occurred here, or is at least being argued. Regarding prejudice, well, of course there's prejudice per se in the Ninth Circuit in a case like this, but in the first circuit, quote, a lawyer's failure to file a brief will not warrant relief unless there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if counsel had filed a brief with the BIA. End quote. Met here. Because as the first circuit explains, quote, the IJ based her order denying adjustment of status on several findings, for which the hearing record contains no factual predicate. End quote. So a well-written brief by counsel could have highlighted that. Remand. On the substance of that, essentially the IJ faulted Miss Buckley for a bunch of things that no one asked her about. Not allowed to do that, the court seems to be holding. Indeed, quote, it is an IJ's statutory duty to assist in developing a sufficient record at the merits hearing. And this statutory duty should be fulfilled in every case, regardless of whether the petitioner is pro se. End quote. To get specific for all you folks, quote, the IJ asked Miss Buckley no substantive questions during the brief hearing. Miss Buckley's counsel focused on the age of the charges against Miss Buckley, and that none of them resulted in a conviction. If the IJ believed that other considerations about these charges were critical to her weighing the adjustment of status equities, it was incumbent upon her to ask Miss Buckley about them before invoking these considerations to deny relief. End quote. And you can see what's happening, right? Counsel doesn't want to put the entire criminal arrest history that's really old into the record, even though it's Miss Buckley's burden, and then the IJ doesn't like that, but the IJ didn't ask her questions about what she wanted to hear, and so the First Circuit is saying you can't do that. Counsel is though really kind of stuck between a rock and a hard place in presenting these relief claims when there's a criminal history like this. Do you err on the side of disclosing everything, even if there's no conviction? I don't know. But in the First Circuit, if the IJ has questions, the IJ needs to follow up. On the IJ's failure to follow up, but then denial on that basis, Miss Buckley's counsel has been trying to raise this argument at every opportunity ever since it happened, and that is important to the First Circuit here. Finally, the BIA was materially wrong that Miss Buckley didn't file her brief that she intended to file with the BIA. She filed it with the late filed appeal, but the VIA then returned it to counsel. She also included it as an appendix in the First Circuit without objection by the government. All that is enough to the court. In any event, the motion to reopen itself had enough arguments on this, didn't really need the brief itself. Stop being such sticklers, BIA. The First Circuit seems to be saying unclear what the BIA is up to, and so the First Circuit remanded. Meaning, congratulations, Stephen McCall, born for petitioner. Although kind of bittersweet and weird congratulations given all the circumstances, but a petition for review win it is. And that is Buckley V. Blanche.

SPEAKER_00

Moving on to the Board of Immigration Appeals, as we always must do. First is a matter of AHD published by the BIA. The BIA began this week by overturning an immigration judge's asylum grant. Kinda different than previous weeks, where the BIA sometimes waits a few days to overturn an IJ's asylum grant. Hey look, I've got to figure out some way to differentiate and spice these BIA decisions up for you. This is a pro se

Matter of N-A-G-C-, 29 I&N Dec 662 (BIA 2026)

SPEAKER_00

non-citizen on the appeal who did not respond to the complicated briefing requirements of a BIA asylum appeal. Come on, BIA, come on, guys. You don't have enough represented non-citizens to make your case law through. Not trying to put a target on my back, but it just seems so beneath an appellate court to continuously make precedential, undefended pro se wins that become losses. Mr. AHD is from Mauritania. He set forth two different claims for relief, one based on his political opinion and one based on membership at a particular social group, namely the Hadadin Minority Tribe. He was detained and beaten by police after participating in a march with the country's former president. Separately, he dated a woman from a higher-ranking tribe during university and wanted to marry her, but the woman's family rejected him, and the brother and cousins attacked him so bad that he had to spend a week in the hospital and received multiple surgeries. It seems really bad. And technically, the immigration judge actually granted withholding of removal, not asylum, because the asylum application was untimely. The BIA has reversed that on DHS's appeal. The case arises in the Ninth Circuit, so the BIA applies Ninth Circuit past persecution precedent and deemed the police beating lacking. Quote, some circumstances that cause applicants physical discomfort or loss of liberty do not qualify as persecution, despite the fact that such conditions have caused the applicants some harm. The non-exclusive factors to consider in the Ninth Circuit are, quote, physical violence and resulting serious injuries, frequency of harm, specific threats combined with confrontation, length and quality of detention, harm to family and close friends, economic deprivation, and general societal turmoil. End quote. That's Sharma Vigarla in episode 157. Here, Mr. A. H. D. was detained for three days without charge. How would you like that? Quote, he was beaten on the first day, but testified that he did not suffer significant injuries from the beating and did not seek medical treatment, end quote. Also, he saw others hit and insulted, but that was it. Not enough for the BIA. The BIA does note in a footnote that under Ninth Circuit precedent, quote, the fact that the respondent did not suffer serious injuries is relevant, but not dispositive, to our conclusion, end quote. The BIA continues in a footnote that, quote, serious physical injuries are not required to demonstrate persecution, and we focus on the conduct of the persecutor rather than solely on the level of harm or subjective suffering the applicant experienced. End quote. Important, all of it. But not enough to win the day here. Regarding the girlfriend-related stuff, well, the BIA doesn't believe that Mr. AHD met his burden to establish that the Mauritanian government was unable or unwilling to control the family, that is, to protect him from the private actor harm. Recall, that wouldn't have been an issue for the first harm, because that was the government doing it, but again it was deemed lacking. That is the level of harm. Here we've got an unable or unwilling to protect problem to the BIA. Mr. AHD had an expert witness in everything. And that was relied on by the immigration judge to find that, quote, the Mauritanian government does not interfere in tribal conflicts, end quote. Truly combing the record to overturn an IJ's pro-noncitizen fact finding, the BIA explains that, quote, this finding mischaracterizes the expert's testimony. As the expert explained that the government usually does not get involved in the tribe's resolution of a tribal conflict, but will intervene if a party fails to abide by a tribal agreement or if violence in a particular situation escalates. And if that's true, well, that undermines an unable or unwilling to protect finding quote. The fact that a country sanctions or incorporates traditional means of conflict resolution within its justice system does not demonstrate that the government is unable or unwilling to provide protection. End quote. Here, Mr. A.H.D. apparently didn't seek assistance from his tribal leadership. And in any event, police opened an investigation. So to recap, government beating, not bad enough. Horrible non-governmental beating with a clear nexus, searching the record to overturn the IJ on unable or unwilling to protect based on tribal protections. Still a remand, though. First, because the IJ based the withholding of removal grants on past persecution, the IJ didn't adjudicate whether Mr. AHD had a well-founded fear of future persecution without a past persecution presumption. So Mr. AHD is getting that shot here, even though his win was taken away. He's going to get another chance to try to get withholding of removal without the past persecution presumption. Gonna get an opportunity on convention against torch protection too, because the IJ didn't have cause to reach the issue before. Expressing no opinions on the ultimate outcome, the BIA vacated the IJ's withholding of removal grant and remanded. And that is matter of AHD. Moving on to matter of Germaine, published by the BIA. The formerly non-precedential, now precedential BIA decisions are back. And well it shows. This case is about LPR cancellation of removal. An immigration judge granted Mr. Germain that relief, meaning he was a lawful permanent resident and remains a lawful permanent resident because he got the relief. Before I get to the merits of the decision, the BIA drops an absolutely extraordinary footnote to me. See, the IJ granted LPR cancellation in December 2018. Folks, it is May 2026. I don't know how untimely DHS's appeal was, but it must have been massively so. In a footnote, the BIA states that it, quote, already accepted DHS's appeal, and we are not persuaded to dismiss the appeal as untimely as the respondent requests, end quote. Call me old-fashioned, but it is completely unfathomable to me that an appellate body would make a case precedential and not explain its extraordinary decision to accept a late-filed appeal. It just seems so transparent to me that the BIA is not overly concerned about the perceptions at the moment that it is operating in good faith. If I have misread the procedural history, please, someone at the BIA let me know. But I don't think I am. The appeal was untimely. And curious minds from both DHS and the non citizens bar would love to know the reasons that the BIA deems accepting a late filed appeal warranted. And here you have the precedential ability to let us know. But you don't use it? I don't get it. Also, more on this at the end. Honor the merits, the BIA weighed the positive factors against the negative and reached a conclusion different than the IJ for this Haitian lawful permanent resident. Swearing, of course, that it is not fact-finding, just weighing.

unknown

Mr.

SPEAKER_00

Jermaine has, quote, significant equities, end quote, and has lived in the U.S. as long as I have been alive. And he's been an LPR for nearly 30 years. But he has a criminal history, quote, against these positive factors, we weigh the respondent's criminal history, which includes two assault and battery convictions in 2003 and 2007, and three firearms-related convictions arising from the same incident in 2008, for which he served 18 months in prison. The respondent also was charged in 2000 for leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage, was charged twice for driving an unlicensed taxi in 2013 and 2014, and received a summons for threatening to commit a crime stemming from a 2014 interaction with the hotel manager. So if you're counting, five convictions from three events from about 15 to 20 years ago. Has he changed since? We are not really informed, although the BIA mentions that he coaches his son's sports teams. Also, as pointed out to me on Facebook, about those assault and battery matters, we learn this from another pretty extraordinary footnote. Quote, the disposition in both cases was continued without a finding, which constitutes a conviction for immigration

Matter of Mills, 29 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 2026)

SPEAKER_00

purposes. See INA section 101A48A. End quote. That's it. That's the whole footnote. I'm not gonna lie, I have no idea what that means. I mean, I know what INA section 101A48A means, but I don't know what that sentence means. That's the entirety of the analysis. Seems like an entire paragraph or more is needed to explain why the heck it is possibly a correct sentence. But a sentence it is. And that's the important thing. The VIA doesn't think the IJ sufficiently considered the dismissed cases. The allegations underlying the dismissed cases constitute, quote, evidence that the respondent repeatedly disregarded the laws of the United States, including after his release from imprisonment. End quote. I don't know. Sounds like fact-finding to me. The BIA also doesn't like what it sees as Mr. Germain downplaying his assault and battery offenses. And it doesn't like that he denied making the 2014 threat for which he was not convicted. Quote, the respondent's argument that his lack of convictions since 2009 establishes his rehabilitation ignores the unfavorable conduct that occurred after his release from imprisonment. End quote. Conduct never proved in any court and dismissed. So the BIA ordered Mr. Germain removed to Haiti. A thought. Episode 273. Recall in that decision, the court held that the BIA cannot self-certify an untimely DHS appeal challenging adjustment of status grant because the moment the IJA's decision becomes final, the LPR obtains all rights and protections due in LPR, including the protection that LPR status can only be taken away in rescision proceedings. Or I suppose if Marco Rubio simply writes a letter. What a time to be alive. Anyway, I know this is LPR cancellation and not a grant of adjustment of status per se, but shouldn't this be the same thing? As no removal order ever existed against Mr. Germain, hasn't he remained an LPR the entire time? And regardless, he surely became an LPR again, the second DHS failed to timely appeal, and the IJ's grant became final. Seems to me that this case is ripe for challenge in whatever circuit that this arises in, based on Katanani. Would love to give it an attempt. Hit me up, counsel. And that is Matter of Germaine. Continuing on with Matter of Nawagwu, published by the BIA. This case also used to not be precedential until

Matter of J-O-A-, 29 I&N Dec 672 (BIA 2026)

SPEAKER_00

Acting Attorney General Blanche allegedly got wind of it. It is about revoking immediate relative I-130 petition grants. USCS previously granted an I-130 for Miss Nawagwu's benefit. But USCS can always revoke it for good and sufficient cause, and the Supreme Court made that non-reviewable in federal court last year, which was cute. I'll give them that. Quote, good and sufficient cause to revoke an approved visa petition exists if the evidence in the record at the time of the decision, including explanatory and rebuttal evidence, warrants a denial based on the petitioner's failure to sustain his or her burden of proof. End quote. Here it looks like everyone agrees the current marriage is bona fide. And that's the marriage that Miss Nawabu is currently seeking immigration benefits through. But USCS and the BIA have issue with Miss Nawabu's previous marriage from a long time ago. As we've recently learned, mere marriage solely for immigration purposes without even any action being taken for an immigration benefit is sufficient for an IA Section 204C permanent petition bar finding. Also known as marriage for, quote, evading the immigration laws, end quote. Here actually, Miss Oabu and her former spouse very much sought immigration benefits, and Ms. Oahu previously applied for an I-130, it appears, or that is her husband did, and she was a beneficiary. Under BIA precedent, to revoke, quote, an affirmative finding based upon substantial and probative evidence that the beneficiary's prior marriage was actually fraudulent is required. End quote. Matt Hare explains the BIA. And my goodness, the former husband passed away all the way back in 1996. The BIA recognizes the quote unfortunate circumstances of his passing, end quote, but doesn't say much more. Feels like there's a whole lot missing from that statement. And the BIA does recognize that at the time the couple, quote, held themselves out as married, had joined bank accounts, vehicle registrations, and made purchases together, end quote. But the BIA sees significant fraud too, quote, of particular importance is the fact that in August 1996, the beneficiary's former husband signed and swore to a handwritten affidavit detailing the fraudulent nature of his marriage to the beneficiary, end quote. And then he died. And if I'm putting the BIA's cryptic writing together with my own experience in some cases, I suspect he may have committed suicide. But I have no proof from this decision for that assumption. And that affidavit was also signed by the man's mother and another person who witnessed it, although the mother later recanted. Looks like this is actually a sworn statement, not like an affidavit submitted to USCIS, and it's kind of seeming like it all happened at a site visit, but I'm not sure. The BIA and USCIS recounted the mother's later recantation because it quote was filed almost a decade later and does not persuade us to discount the fact that she contemporaneously signed the 1996 affidavit as a witness, and no such concerns were apparently raised, you know, around 1996, end quote. But like, how else can you show that this is a bona fide marriage, guys? If of course it is actually a bona fide marriage. How else would someone prove it when the mother's recanting and you're rejecting that, and the ex-husband has passed away? Nor does the BIA believe a doctor's letter about the former husband's cognitive condition from the time moves the needle. Seems important to me if the argument was that he was not mentally stable at the time because he commits suicide shortly thereafter. But again, assumptions, because the BIA isn't actually saying these things. Plus, to the BIA, there was a government site visit document, a memorandum, which the BIA has, quote, no reason to doubt, end quote. That memo relays that the mother said during a site visit that she didn't know that her son was married and could not identify Ms. Dewagwu in a photograph. And it's a detailed memorandum, explains the BIA. More going on here, too, this is quite the fact-intensive case, and it's been going on for quite a while before USCIS and the BIA. Quote, we also agree with USCIS that it is highly relevant that the death certificate of the beneficiary's former husband lists him as never married. And that's an official record. Quote, while the record does contain a marriage certificate for the beneficiary and her former husband, it is not improbable for parties to register a fraudulent marriage with a marriage certificate, end quote. So is USAS alleging a double fraud there? Truly academic question, or I don't know, maybe not. Can a Section 204C finding be sustained where an actual marriage never legally occurred? Isn't that just regular fraud? Reading the statutory text of Section 204C, it does seem that an actual marriage or an actual conspiracy to actually marry is required by the text. Interesting legal question. Quote, we find it more persuasive that following the death of the beneficiary's former husband, no one recognized that such a marital relationship had ever existed, particularly in conjunction with the other record evidence indicating that the marriage was not bona fide, but was instead fraudulent. End quote. I don't know. Interesting. That is, if this was not even a legal marriage from the get-go, but also I'm not sure that's what the BIA is implying. In any way, Miss Nwagu isn't arguing that somewhat wild, but persuasive legal theory to me at least. Ultimately, the BIA is putting a whole lot of weight into the sworn statement just before the ex-husband's passing and his mother's actions. There's even a videotape that the BIA mentions in passing in a footnote that apparently might help Miss Nawagu. Give me more deeds, BIA! Don't leave a guy hanging. But Miss Nwagu is in trouble in a decision that would appear to make it easier to revoke an I-130 petition and reach a Section 204C finding. And that is Matter of Nouagwu.

SPEAKER_01

Moving on, we have Matter of Martinez Rodriguez published by the BIA. The BIA seems to be having one of its weeks. I've come to recognize these weeks now over the years. Or at least over the last year and a half. Seems like there are weeks now where the BIA decides to dump a bunch of formally non-precedential decisions made precedential by whoever is operating on behalf of Todd Blanche. This is one of those weeks. Hey, at least they're short, generally.

Matter of S-E-M-Z-, 29 I&N Dec 680 (BIA 2026)

SPEAKER_01

This one is two pages, and it's about bond. Mr. Martinez Rodriguez wants one. And he got one for fifteen thousand dollars. No small amount, truly. Like kinda high even in the criminal context, pre-conviction. And Mr. Martinez Rodriguez has completed a criminal sentence. He has gone through the process and come out on the other side. Something I learned in law school meant that society viewed him as rehabilitated and generally worthy of a second chance. Immigration begs to differ. For some reason, non-citizens are considered dangerous even after they finish their criminal sentence. The same U.S. citizen would not be by society. But if you have a different birthplace, you are a unforgivable danger. Such that you can't be released from prison after your criminal process plays itself out, depending on the conviction, I guess. That's what's happening here, at least. Legalese aside. DHS appealed the immigration judge's grant of a $15,000 bond. And I don't know, maybe Mr. Martinez Rodriguez is a lawful permanent resident. Seems he might be. No idea what, if any, positive factors the IJ found, or what evidence Mr. Martinez Rodriguez presented. But it does explain that he has the burden to establish bond eligibility. Another thing the Department of Justice made up and is not present in the criminal context or the statute itself. How do you prove a negative that someone is not a danger? Well, the BIA is essentially saying that once you get a conviction, you're a danger like forever.

unknown

Mr.

SPEAKER_01

Martinez Rodriguez has a false imprisonment conviction from August 2021, for which he spent almost a year in prison. He was arrested for more stuff vandalism, burglary, and domestic violence, but the criminal justice system played itself out into a misdemeanor conviction for false imprisonment. That is a serious criminal history, explains the BIA. That is that one event. And literally that is it. That is the bond case that the BIA decided to publish. And that is Matter of Martinez, Rodriguez. Concluding our BIA journey, we have Matter of Richards. This one is slightly longer. It also involves criminal stuff, but this one regards LPR cancellation of removal. Mr. Richards wants a second chance. That is LPR cancellation. The immigration judge denied his application, and the BIA affirmed that denial here. DHS, who unlike all pro se cases we've done of late, was represented by an attorney, did not file an appellate brief. This is a formally non-presidential decision as well. Mr. Richard has been in LPR since 1992, but really messed up by not applying to naturalize. Seventeen years later, he was convicted of possessing marijuana in Texas. That's the crime. Am I remembering correctly that our Secretary of Health and Human Services is on record about his history of snorting cocaine off public toilets and extensive use of heroin? Or am I thinking of another cabinet secretary? Or multiple? Betcha it's multiple. Mr. Richards possessed some marijuana and got convicted for it. That doesn't make him removable, but it does potentially make him inadmissible if he dares to take a vacation abroad and return, which is what he did. Makes him an applicant for admission, INA section 11813C. It is a very dangerous statute, and Mr. Richards is right in the middle of it. He's eligible for LPR cancellation of removal, though. Might also be eligible for readjustment to LPR status with the Section 212H waiver if he's got a petitioner, but LPR cancellation is easier to get if you got the gears. But Mr. Richards' problem is to the IJ and the BIA that he didn't testify credibly regarding his criminal history. Seems that an FBI criminal history report submitted in this case documents more than just the 2009 marijuana possession, arrests and convictions of the past, and beyond simple drug use or drugs at all. So that's not great. I wonder what's going on. Never a good idea to misrepresent a criminal history in immigration court. Non-citizens should think hard about their past when it's all on the line during their testimony. Mr. Richards said he didn't remember the other stuff. But the IG didn't believe that, and neither does the BIA. Seems like Mr. Richards has some interesting arguments about all this on appeal that unfortunately the BIA rejects without explaining what the arguments are. Given this, the IGA was also not wrong to deny as a matter of discretion, explains the BIA. Mr. Richards' length of time in the United States as an LPR and his employment history is, quote, significant equities, end quote. Something the BIA keeps saying in these decisions. But then the BIA always finds that they're outweighed of late. What does significant mean to you, BIA, if they are always outweighed by the criminal history? Here it's outweighed by Mr. Richards' perceived lack of candor about his criminal history. Even though he hasn't had an arrest since 2008, 18 years ago. That is a long time to be a good person, and the BIA all but concedes that it establishes rehabilitation in this case. But it is outweighed by his lack of candor, which also shows to the IG and the BIA that maybe he didn't fully rehabilitate. As such, the BIA affirmed the removal order against a one-time LPR, Mr. Richards, an individual who it appears would never have lost his green card, and actually probably could have naturalized instead

Perez-Castillo v. Blanche, No. 25-1988 (7th Cir. June 1, 2026)

SPEAKER_01

had he simply not taken a brief trip abroad, likely for vacation. And that is a matter of Richards.

SPEAKER_00

I know I didn't. Yet here you are. H 1B season in full swing, and your team is buried in beneficiary forms, document chasing, and data entry. That's $400 an hour in legal talent doing $20 an hour work. Staffi plugs directly into your workflow. Staffi handles the data entry, document collection, and H1B form prep. Your team reviews it, you approve it, you bill. With the new wage-weighted selection process adding even more admin pressure this season, the firms that scale are the ones that stop doing it all themselves. Say yes to more H1B clients without burning out your team. Visit staffy.cc or call 786-891-5619 or click on the special link in the show notes. Because you deserve a practice that grows without burning you out. Continuing on with United States v. Scott, published by the Fourth Circuit on May 26, 2026. This is a crime of violence sentence enhancement case. Judge Naymeyer dissented. It's a felon in possession conviction that gets a lot more time in prison for Mr. Scott if his prior conviction for violating the Virginia Code Section 18.2-53.1 is a crime of violence. That sentence enhancement definition is nearly identical to the immigration aggravated felony definition at INA section 101A43Fs. Seems like six district courts at least have held that this conviction is a crime of violence because it requires the use attempted use or threatened use of physical force. But those district courts were wrong, explains the Fourth Circuit. The Virginia Statute makes it illegal, quote, to use or attempt to use any pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm, or display such weapon in a threatening manner while committing or attempting to commit one of twelve enumerated offenses. Those twelve offenses are divisible, and the one at issue here is robbery. Seems violent, no? Especially when combined with the weapon requirement? Well, not really, when you recall, as the Fourth Circuit did, that on episode 253, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Parham that robbery and violation of Virginia law does not qualify as a crime of violence under the guidelines element clause. And that all followed a Virginia Supreme Court certified question on the issue. So, like, very powerful stuff for the categorical approach. When the state Supreme Court has the last word on a question certified by a circuit, kind of gonna be the end of the story there. And ah, yes, I do remember that one, that is Parham. How can I not? In that case, the Fourth Circuit relayed that the Virginia Supreme Court told the Fourth Circuit that in Virginia, quote, a person may be convicted of robbery if they obtain money or any valuable property while in the victim's presence by threatening to publicly accuse the victim of having committed sodomy, end quote. So that's not necessarily violent, right? That's the point. And okay, but here you've got the added weapon element, right? So I guess the least culpable conduct would be displaying or mentioning a firearm while at the same time threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy to get some money from the victim? And let's make it jewels. Either way, quite the crime that one. It doesn't require the use of attempted use or threatened use of physical force. Give me the jewels, or I'm gonna post about you doing sodomy on Facebook. By the way, I'm very serious, I have a pistol on me. Said the dumbest criminal ever. Until he gets all your jewels, jokes on you. All that is essentially possible under the plain text of the statute as described by the Virginia Supreme Court. This despite the Fourth Circuit's suspicion that quote, the overwhelming majority, if not all, Virginia defendants convicted of robbery and living memory, acquired the stolen property by threatening their victims with physical harm. Rather than public accusations of sodomy, end quote. The categorical approach, not to mention prior force circuit precedent, is a powerful thing. On the firearm component specifically, while the Virginia statutes quote requires that the defendant use, attempt to use, or display a firearm in a threatening manner, at some point while committing the robbery, it likewise does not require that the use or attempted use be against another person or be employed to overcome the victim's resistance. So there you go. It does not matter to the court whether you can identify a real-world occurrence or prosecution, explains the court. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit creates a circuit split on this very Virginia statute with the First Circuit, which for some reason had before it the exact same Virginia crime in a crime of violence decision last April in the United States v Mao. I didn't do Mao because I rarely, if ever, do non-immigration crime of violence cases that sustain a crime of violence finding. But still, here you have your split. And the Fourth Circuit respectfully disagrees with the first and thinks that it, the first, misread some Virginia law. Also, the Parham decision is quite important, and quote, Parham does not bind the First Circuit, but it does bind us. End quote. The court goes on for a bit more on things that have no application to immigration, and Judge Naymeyer thinks it's all a bit silly, it seems, but it is a win for Mr. Scott. And so, congratulations, Jeremy C. Cammons of the Office of the Federal Public Defender in Alexandria, Virginia. And that is United States v. Scott.

SPEAKER_01

Moving on, we have Lopez Vasquez v. Blanche, published by the Eighth Circuit on May 29th, 2026. This case is largely about hardship. Miss Lopez Vasquez entered the United States without authorization 20 years ago and has been living in Missouri ever since. She's from Guatemala and has six U.S. citizen children, ages two to twenty. She applied for non-LPR cancellation of removal and immigration court as well as voluntary departure. But, despite some good letters of support, it seems, the IJ denied. The BIA affirmed on hardship and some other grounds, and DHS removed Miss Lopez Vasquez during the pendency of her Eighth Circuit petition for review. So she's in Guatemala right now. She will not be coming back. Miss Lopez Vasquez first argued that the IG and BIA violated her constitutional due process rights in its flawed hardship analysis. But the Eighth Circuit says she can't even bring that argument. It sees the statutorily defined non-LPR cancellation of removal as, quote, roughly equivalent to executive clemency, over which the executive branch has unfettered discretion, end quote. Meaning to the Eighth Circuit, IJAs and the BIA can do pretty much whatever they want and not be reviewed for a due process violation. Wow. Doesn't mean she doesn't have an argument that the agency violated that statute, though, but the Eighth Circuit doesn't see a claim. Quote, although we accept Miss Lopez Vasquez's contention that effectively losing their mother and primary caregiver qualifies as a severe hardship to her minor children, there was sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that such a hardship is not substantially different from or beyond that which would normally be expected to result from their mother's deportation. End quote. Which is what the law has developed to require of non-LPR cancellation of removal.

Lnu, et al. v. Blanche, No. 24-4790 (9th Cir. June 3, 2026)

SPEAKER_01

The minor children will be residing in the United States with the older children, it seems, and can benefit from all the U.S. has to offer, explains the court. On the voluntary departure denial, the Eighth Circuit issued a harsh one, quote, those claims are moot because she already has been deported to Guatemala in accordance with a lawful removal order. We thus lack jurisdiction under Article III to consider them. End quote. Big yikes, guys, big yikes. And Miss Lopez Vasquez lost her case. And that is Lopez Vasquez V Blanche. Moving on with the Sixth Circuit, we have Remusu V Blanche, published by the Sixth Circuit on May 29th, 2026. This is a fact-intensive one about withholding of removal and non-LPR cancellation of removal.

unknown

Mr.

SPEAKER_01

Nawusu is from Nigeria, came to the United States on a non-immigrant visa in 2002, and has lived here ever since. He is a U.S. citizen wife and children. Quote, two years after his entry, Mr. Nawosu obtained his current job working for a company that helps children and the elderly. End quote. His wife is a nurse at an intensive care unit in a Detroit hospital. Once placed in removal proceedings, he sought withholding of removal because his asylum application was very untimely. The factual basis is a 2004 kidnapping of his father in Nigeria, his elderly father. Recall, Mr. Nawus was in the United States by this point. The kidnappers demanded $50,000 to free the father in Nigeria, who was then in his eighties. They released him five days later, though, because he was sick, and the father passed him a heart issue shortly thereafter.

unknown

Mr.

SPEAKER_01

Nawosu didn't pay. The kidnappers were actually arrested and sentenced, based on, as appears, Mr. Nosu's brother's intervention. They're probably out of prison by now, and Mr. Nosu fears them. An immigration judge denied based on a lack of corroboration, among other things. Plus, the IJ saw it as an economic crime, not persecution on account of unprotected ground. On non-LPI cancellation rule, insufficient hardship to the U.S. citizen children and spouse found by the agency, because the BIA affirmed, as did the Sixth Circuit. On corroboration, the Sixth Circuit believes review highly deferential and unmet here. The Real ID Act permits corroborating evidence required by an IJ, even if a non-citizen is deemed credible. Here, quote, for one thing, Mr. Nosu was able to produce a police report indicating that his father had gone missing and his father's death certificate showing he had died from heart failure. But neither document mentioned any kidnapping. But other public records likely memorialized this crime because Mr. Nwasu testified that the authorities arrested and prosecuted the kidnappers and sentenced them to five years imprisonment. Because Mr. Nawusu was able to produce other official records, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that he should have produced the police or court records that would have confirmed this arrest and prosecution. End quote. Generic country condition evidence doesn't absolve the need for reasonably available direct

Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche, No. 25-9552 (10th Cir. June 1, 2026)

SPEAKER_01

evidence explains the Sixth Circuit. As to the IJ's one-paragraph denial of withholding of removal, quote, the immigration laws do not give us the authority to grade an immigration judge's opinion writing abilities. End quote. Now a non-citizen must be given the opportunity to explain why they didn't provide the desired corroborating evidence, but explains the Sixth Circuit. The IJ need not say what it is and then ask for it. It is sufficient in the Sixth Circuit that, like here, ICE asks about additional evidence, and the non-citizen then gives an explanation that is deemed lacking. Provided, of course, that it's important evidence. In response to these questions, though, Mr. Nawosu said only that he didn't ask for any letters and didn't know that he needed the public records. End quote. That would fall short to the Sixth Circuit, at least here. Turning to non-LPR cancellation of removal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial, applying substantial evidence review. Yes, there was country condition evidence showing bad conditions in Nigeria, but quote, his children would remain in this country, where they have been healthy and doing well in school. And his partner has a full-time job as a nurse at a hospital. So Mr. Nusu fails to show that the wife would be unable to financially support the children by herself. End quote. Plus, he testified that he has many relatives living safely in Nigeria. There was a bit more discussed, but that's the gist. And it's not a good one for Mr. Nusso. And that is Nausu B Blanche.

SPEAKER_00

Our final case is Argeta Castillo B Blanche, published by the First Circuit on May 27, 2026. This case is about non-LPR cancellation removal and exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Seems like Mr. Argeta Castillo is a generally good dude with no criminal record who has lived in the US for a long time. He's from Guatemala. In removal proceedings, he applied for asylum and related relief and protection and for non-LPR cancellation removal. Basically, the only things available to someone like him. He asserted that his 13 and 17-year-old U.S. citizen daughters would suffer the requisite hardship if he was removed to Guatemala. He testified they'd go with him to that country as would his non-citizen spouse. The oldest daughter suffers from somnibullism, also known as sleepwalking, which Mr. Argeta Castillo described as an anxiety disorder. The daughter cries in the middle of the night and walks while asleep. Episodes which began when she was four years old and occur about three to four times a month.

unknown

Mr.

SPEAKER_00

Argeta Castillo fears that she'll accidentally hurt herself one day. Therapy notes show that she suffers from anxiety too, much of it appears related to her parents' immigration statuses. The youngest daughter has vision issues, including what's colloquial known as a lazy eye. She wears glasses and apparently was once told she could go blind without treatment, although the First Circuit states that no medical records exist for that. The immigration judge of the BIA didn't believe all of it was bad enough, even in Guatemala, quote, especially given his $75,000 in savings, end quote. And well, applying the deferential standard of review from the Supreme Court's Wilkinson decision, the First Circuit affirmed. Non-LPR cancellation of removal hardship requires a showing that the children, quote, would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or beyond that which would normally be expected from the deportation of a non-citizen with close family members in the United States. End quote. And all hardships must be considered in the aggregate. Quote, while an applicant's child's poor health is a compelling factor, the applicant must further establish that the relative has a serious medical condition, and, if he or she is accompanying the applicant into the country of removal, that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country. End quote. Three arguments were made on petition for review, all rejected. First, the first circuit does not at all believe that the IG and the BIA ignored hardship evidence, and the record shows that the agency properly considered hardship in the aggregate. Lots of evidence considered actually explains the First Circuit. In any event, even the apparently unmentioned things, like the daughter's English fluency and lack of Spanish fluency and lack of ties in Guatemala, don't undermine the agency's ultimate decision to the court. Particularly as to the court, Mr. Argueda Castillo didn't really explain why they are so important. That is, this other evidence. The last argument was a challenge to the agency's finding that Mr. Argueda Castillo failed to establish one, that his daughters had serious medical conditions, and two, that adequate

Muchiri v. Blanche, No. 25-1340 (1st Cir. June 3, 2026)

SPEAKER_00

medical care for his daughters would be unavailable in Guatemala. Tough burdens for non-citizens in these cases. To the first circuit, that is fact-finding. That is trying to get the circuit to disagree with what the BIA found about the serious medical conditions and the adequate medical care abroad. And well, Wilkinson in the statute precludes circuits from second-guessing fact-finding in the non-LPR cancellation of removal context. It's not a mixed question of law in fact or a pure question of law. Probably doesn't hurt that the court appears to agree with the agency's fact-finding, too. And so, it denied the petition for review. And that is our Geta Castillo v Blanche. So there you have it. You're all caught up with the past week's published immigration cases. I'm Kevin A. Gregg, a partner with the law firm Kurzban, Kurzban Titselli, and Pratt, and this has been another episode of Immigration Review. Thank you for listening and I hope you enjoyed it. If you did, please share it with a friend and rate and review us. Each review helps new listeners find the show. And of course, subscribe to Immigration Review wherever you get your podcasts. If you like what we do and want to become a patron of the show, please check out our Patreon page at www.patreon.com forward slash immigration review or click on the link in the show notes. And if you're interested in an official Immigration Review CLE certificate, email me at kgreg at kktplaw.com with your full name and the episode numbers for the 10 shows you've listened to. Also, feel free to email me with questions, comments, or anything at all, and follow the show on Instagram and Facebook at ImmigrationReview, or send us a tweet at Imreview. That's IMM Review. And you know we're always interested in hearing listener feedback.

SPEAKER_01

Like this review about the episode you just listened to from my very young son. Son, how did you like that episode? Indeed.

SPEAKER_00

If you like my son, enjoyed what you just heard again, please give the Patreon payer some love, feel free to review the pod, reach out to me with your own kind sounds, or do anything else nice that your heart desires. I'll be back next week for a brand new discussion. Until then, I'm Kevin A. Gregg, bringing you the Immigration Review.