Immigration Review

Ep. 312 - Precedential Decisions: 4/13/2026 - 04/19/2026 (clear error review; no closing argument; alleged national security threat; Secretary of State letter; alleged fraud; conviction & community service; hardship & Roma; aggravated felony rape)

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Taveras Martinez v. Blanche, No. 24-1741 (1st Cir. Apr. 17, 2026)

  • adjustment of status; clear error review; use of false identity and intent; discretion

 


Matter of A-M-Z-F-, 29 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2026)

  • due process; prejudice; no right to closing argument; Coptic Christians; Muslim Brotherhood; adverse credibility; Egypt 

 


Matter of M-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 556 (BIA 2026)

  • alleged national security threat to Jewish students; Secretary of State letter; INA § 237(a)(4)(C)(i); fraud or willful misrepresentation; failure to list UN internship; INA § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver; asylum and protection from Algeria and Syria; discovery

 


Gardner v. Blanche, No. 24-1553 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026)

  • conviction; community service INA § 101(a)(48)(A); North Caroling misdemeanor larceny; two CIMTs; non-LPR cancellation of removal;  Prayer for Judgment Continued (PJC)

 


Petrov v. Blanche, No. 20-3517 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026)

  • exceptional and extremely unusual hardship review; mistreatment of Roma; gypsies; Germany; motion to reopen and previously unavailable evidence; financial hardship

 


United States v. Gonzalez-Reyes, No. 23-3532 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026)

  • aggravated felony rape; duress; non-violent coercion; unpublished decision satisfies realistic probability test; Cal. Pen. Code § 261(a)(2); criminal illegal reentry; contemporaneous dictionaries over the model penal code; state rape laws not helpful; battle of the dictionaries




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SPEAKER_00

Welcome to Immigration Review, your weekly source for immigration case law updates and insights. I'm your host, Kevin A. Gregg, a partner at the Immigration, Medical Malpractice, and Business Litigation Law Firm Curzban, Kurzban, Tetzelli, and Pratt. Back again to review the week's precedential immigration cases, rummaging through the decisions so you don't have to. This podcast is sponsored by Serenade e-immigration. Here's a quick tip if you're starting to book software demos. Don't go in blind. It's too easy to get overwhelmed when every platform looks the same on the surface. The team at eMigration put together the 25 questions to ask before choosing immigration law software. It helps you dig into things like forms, workflows, support, and long-term fit before you commit. Grab it at get.eimmigration.com forward slash IRP or click on the special link in the show notes before your next vendor demo. This podcast is also sponsored by Gonzalez and Gonzalez Immigration Bonds. Immigration Attorneys. Once you've secured a bond, let Gonzalez and Gonzalez take it from there. In business and family-owned for 75 years, Gonzalez ⁇ Gonzalez helps other families post immigration bonds quickly, easily, and with full support every step of the way. Sure, you can post directly with DHS, but that means no guidance, no help when something goes wrong, and a four to six month wait for a refund. With Gonzalez and Gonzalez, families get hands-on help throughout the entire process and typically get refunds within one to two weeks of receiving the I-391 notice. Tired of being the point of contact for every bond question? Let Gonzalez and Gonzalez take those calls. They'll handle the paperwork, the system issues, and the family's concerns so you can focus on what really matters: winning the case and helping your clients stay in the country. You can reach Gonzalez and Gonzalez at 833-409-9200. Their fee? And for bonds of $10,000 or more, they can defer the fee and deduct it from the refund. Financing options? They've got those too. Give Gonzalez and Gonzalez a call, check them out at immigrationbond.com, or click on their special link in the show notes. And as always, this show does not constitute legal advice and has no bias other than to keep you up to date and to enable you, my dear colleagues, to excel in court. So, without further ado, let's start the review. Where to begin this week, folks? Should it be the general anxiety about birthright citizenship being argued at the Supreme Court, notwithstanding the excellent oral argument from ACLU and the general anti-executive order tone of most of the justices? Or should it be the passing, politically speaking, of Pam Bondi? I certainly would not stoop to mentioning the personal family affair of the former DHS Secretary, other than to highlight the hypocrisy and obvious disconnect between the terrible rhetoric and policies of Ms. Gnome and people of her political ilk. Given that the class of people that are so often targeted by Miss Gnome and her political ilk apparently includes Miss Gnome's husband. Welcome to America, April 2026. Also, to be clear, no shade at all on Miss Gnome's not public figure and to my knowledge, not political husband. Here are some weird circuit cases this week that didn't make the full rundown. First, the Seventh Circuit published a decision so silly that I'm not gonna do it. Muthana v. Mark Wayne Mullen. US citizen Mr. Muthana sued USCIS for denying an I-130 for his stepdaughter based on an allegation that USCS sent a noid to the wrong address, but in his lawsuit he submitted the I-130 with the address portion redacted. Kinda weird thing to do, right? Because that's like the whole claim. And when DHS responded, they included the I-130, showing that indeed Mr. Muthana provided the address that he claimed USCIS then erroneously mailed the Noid to. Counsel didn't even appear for the district court hearing, possibly out of embarrassment.

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Muthana didn't appear either, although then appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The whole thing is ridiculous, and I'm not summarizing more of it. Second, in Ram Gulam di Gupta, the Sixth Circuit held that lawful permanent resident cannot sue a U.S. citizen to force the U.S. citizen to provide them financial support promised in an IET-64. At least under these circumstances. Quite a mess. And maybe even here they could have if the husband had raised the issue during divorce proceedings.

Taveras Martinez v. Blanche, No. 24-1741 (1st Cir. Apr. 17, 2026)

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But the reason that it couldn't be enforced here is because the divorce agreement trumped federal law and I-64s. Pretty interesting, and thanks to Russell Bruden for flagging. And finally, on Friday, the DC Circuit affirmed dismissal of a lawsuit filed in response to the first Trump administration's refusal to process diversity visa lottery-based immigrant visa petitions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Remember the pandemic? Lifetime ago. Literally, for some. How soon we forget? And that got dark quick. Here are the cases. Enjoy your April. Alright, let's rock and roll. Escalion vondi, published by the Ninth Circuit on April 2nd, 2026. This is technically the last Bondi. She was fired minutes after its publication. Pamela J, we hardly knew ye. Although, based simply on the order that I do cases, it won't be the last time you hear her name, this episode. This case here is about motions to reopen and due diligence. She came to America in 1978 when she was one year old. What on earth do we do with such people? In 2010, she was convicted of grand theft in violation of Cal Penal Code Section 487A and was sentenced to one year and four months in prison. Sounds like an aggravated felony. Seems like she was probably a lawful permanent resident before that, but not after, because she was ordered removed in 2011. But Armenia wouldn't accept her. It didn't even exist properly when she was born, and so she remained in America with employment authorization, attending her ICE OSIPs. She did that for seven years until 2018 when she learned that Armenia was starting to accept people like her. Freaking out, she obtained counsel, which successfully got Miss Eskillion's conviction vacated, quote, based on procedural defect under California Penal Code Section 1473.7, end quote. That law only came into existence in 2016. Only a few months after that, in July 2019, Miss Eskillion moved to reopen her removal order with the immigration judge. In that motion, filed by counsel, Miss Escillion, quote, explained that she was released in 2011 on an order of supervision, but did not provide facts explaining that she sought to vacate her conviction in 2019, two years after Cal Penal Code Section 1473.7 came into effect in eight years after her removal proceedings, because she only learned about the possibility of being removed to Armenia in June 2018, end quote. Didn't make a diligence argument. An immigration judge looked at that motion and determined that Miss Escillion hadn't established diligence, and therefore that equitable tolling of the 90-day motion to reopen deadline was not warranted. Tough laws. Three weeks later, she filed a second motion to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Now she didn't file a bar complaint and do the other Madrov-Lazatta things because that's not necessarily needed in the Ninth Circuit, where ineffective assistance of counsel is playing on its face. Miss Askillion alleged prejudice, given that she only learned about the possibility of being removed in June 2018. Also, can I just stop to note the irony that had she complied with Madrov Lazata, this whole thing would have been delayed by years? Or at least many, many more months. Kinda weird, right? And IJ denied that second motion to reopen in September 2019. Seems like it was the same judge. Also, now with a second motion to reopen, the IJ deemed it number bar. The BIA affirmed. Among many things, quote, the BIA also rejected Mess Askillion's argument that ineffective assistance was clear on the record and held that she did not show that she suffered prejudice because she waited more than two years after the passage of the relevant California statute before seeking vacature of her conviction, and thus had not demonstrated due diligence. End quote. Ninth Circuit disagreed. Quite a few hurdles here, though. That one motion to reopen bar is tricky, right? Even if equitable tolling could get over the time bar? Well, quote, a motion to reopen that would otherwise be time or number barred can be reviewed if the deadline is subject to equitable tolling. End quote. There you go. End quote, equitable tolling is available when some extraordinary circumstance stood in the petitioner's way and prevented timely filing. And the petitioner acted with due diligence in pursuing the petitioner's rights, end quote, at your legal standard. The Ninth Circuit recently analyzed some of this in Bent v. Garland, explains the panel. Yes, Ms. Eskillion waited over two years after the California vacature statute passed, but in the Ninth Circuit, quote, we measure a petitioner's diligence from the date on which a reasonable person in the petitioner's position is put on notice that something was wrong. End quote. And it's reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence. Viewed in totality, the Ninth Circuit flat out holds that Miss Escillion was diligent, quote, before she was told that she was in imminent danger of removal, nothing in Miss Askillion's order of supervision suggested that Miss Escillion would become subject to immediate removal. Instead, she was designated as a stateless person because there was no country to which she could be removed. Contrary to the government's position at oral

Matter of A-M-Z-F-, 29 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2026)

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argument, it is unreasonable to expect a stateless individual to take affirmative steps to challenge removability when they do not face an immediate threat of removability. End quote. Love the argument and the holding. People like Miss Escillion don't need to continuously reach out to attorneys requesting legal updates and case law changes, explains the Ninth Circuit, although the Immigration Review Podcast is recommended, says the panel. Lawyers aren't free recognizes the court, quote, expecting a stateless individual to retain a lawyer to check annually whether there might be changes in the law that could alter their removability status, and then expecting that individual to challenge removability, even when they face no imminent threat of removability because they are deemed stateless, would go far beyond what is reasonable due diligence. End quote. Seems like such a rule might apply to other people too, such as Cubans and Vietnamese individuals who for years were told that they couldn't be removed. Starting the due diligence clock then in June 2018, when Miss Escillion learned that she could be removed, she did act diligently to the Ninth Circuit. And so finding that also means that the BIA erred in finding that Miss Escillion wasn't prejudiced by the first attorney's failure to make the diligence argument. Seems to also resolve the requirement for strict Lazata compliance, too, right? Noes to Ninth Circuit in a footnote. Remanded, then I'd think, for a grant of the motion to reopen. Meaning, congratulations, Armana Ibrahimian for petitioner. And I can't help myself. Keen observers will have heard that the conviction vacature apparently occurred vis-a-vis Cal Penal Code section 1473.7. Now the Ninth Circuit calls that here a procedural defect, but that was the last we heard of it in this decision. Benton v. Garland, episode 225, holds that Cal Penal Code 1473.7A1 vacatures will be recognized under immigration law. But a bitter BIA held in matter of Jesus Platon, episode 250, that's simply a Cal Penal Code 1473.7 vacature may not suffice. And it seems here all we have is a Cal Penal Code section 1473. Just saying, people. Just saying. And that is Askillion V. Bondi. Next is Verdusco Ruiz V. Bondi, published by the Ninth Circuit on April 1st, 2026. This case is about reinstatement.

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Verdusco Ruiz is from Mexico and has been in between the U.S. and Mexico for a very long time. Way back in 1992, his mother filed an I-130 petition for him. I guess she was a U.S. citizen, and the petition was approved in 93. Unsure the category though, but what we do know is that Mr. Verdusco Ruiz never became a lawful permanent resident. Looks like he tried to come to America in 2000, was deemed inadmissible, and was ordered removed. He re-entered without authorization some time thereafter. Then his wife filed a new I-130 petition for him in 2017. I guess she's a US citizen? But he's got that 2000 removal order, right? Probably an expedited one. Unsure if he even knew about it. Probably did though, because at his adjustment of status interview, the USCIS officer said he was being investigated for false testimony, at which point he admitted that he was in this country unlawfully. I guess he misrepresented that he had entered with inspection and admission in an effort to adjust. Unclear, but that would seem the case, right? When he admitted his unlawful entry, his attorney advised him to remain silent. He was arrested and detained, and then did indeed remain silent. DHS reinstated that 2000 order of removal, albeit after some mishaps. Took that to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit permitted the reinstatement. That's what's happening here. By the way, I guess this is the kind of stuff we have to appeal, petition for review, that is, to retain jurisdiction over an eventual withholding or convention against torture denial post-reinstatement a la Reilly. I'm just saying. This is what a pure reinstatement challenge can sometimes look like. And it doesn't look good. No shade on the arguments, don't get me wrong. They're just very hard. Didn't succeed. Reinstatement came into being in 1997 through IRIRA, INA section 241A5. Mr. Berdusco Ruiz argued that as applied to him, reinstatement is impermissibly retroactive because he began an adjustment of status process well before in 1992. Remember the I-130 petition? And indeed, quote, a law is impermissibly retroactive when applying it would cancel rights that vested before the law's effective date. The problem here is that the Ninth Circuit rejected almost this exact argument in Montoya Beholder from 2014, explains the court. As there, here, Produsco Ruiz' rights hadn't vested yet because he never applied to adjust to LPR status or for consular processing.

Matter of M-K-, 29 I&N Dec. 556 (BIA 2026)

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The court rejected here the attempt to narrow and distinguish Montoya. The court believes it's pretty much on all fours. Having failed there, Produzco Ruiz argued that the 2018 reinstatement should be vacated because he was denied the right to counsel at the time. But quote, there is no statutory right to counsel at the initial stage of reinstatement proceedings, where an immigration officer determines if a prior removal order should be reinstated. End quote. Absent a statutory right, that means it's constitutional due process or bust for Mr. Perdusco Ruiz. And it was bust. Here, even assuming a constitutional right, the Ninth Circuit didn't see prejudice. True, in the Ninth. Sometimes no prejudice showing is required when the right to counsel is violated, such as, say, at an individual hearing in immigration court, no prejudice showing required. But as with Ninth Circuit precedent in the expedited removal context, unfortunately, the reinstatement process is nothing like a merits hearing in immigration court where counsel is critical. For reinstatement, DHS must simply establish that the non-citizen, quote, one, is an alien, two, was subject to a prior order of removal, and three, illegally re-entered the United States. End quote. This means prejudice is not presumed when counsel is denied for expedited removal or reinstatement. All of that means that Mr. Berdusco Ruiz needs to establish a sufficient prejudice showing to win on his due process claim. It's not presumed. And he didn't make that showing to the court. Prejudice requires a showing of, quote, plausible scenarios in which the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had the counsel been present, end quote. It was shown in that last Ninth Circuit decision we just did, right? Not shown here. For example, even before reinstatement, Berdusco Ruiz had admitted that he was present in the U.S. without authorization. And by the time of at least the second reinstatement, after some of it was cleaned up, Mr. Berdusco Ruiz was represented by counsel, even at the Ninth Circuit, in a first petition for review that was eventually remanded. The Ninth Circuit believes it's speculative that counsel could have convinced ICE not to reinstate and to instead initiate regular removal proceedings, which ICE does indeed have authority to do. And in any event, ICE might not have even let the attorney speak at such a proceeding, as they're not required to do so, explains the court. All of it's too speculative. For all those reasons, it appears that Mr. Verdusco Ruiz will soon be removed physically. Put up a good fight, though. And that is Verdusco Ruiz V. Bondi. Rounding out the Ninth Circuit, we have United States V Casildo, published by the Ninth on March 31st, 2026. This is a criminal sentence enhancement type offense, much of which is inapplicable to immigration. It is relevant, however, because the Ninth Circuit holds here that sale of controlled substances in violation of Nevada-Rise Statute Section 453.311 is not a controlled substance offense. Namely, it's not a drug trafficking offense for sentence enhancement purposes. Based on that reasoning, then it seems to me that it wouldn't be an aggravated felony at INA section 11843B, right? Here's what's up. As relevant. So Nevada criminalizes doing things with more drugs than do the feds, making that statute over broad vis-a-vis the drug at issue. But the Ninth Circuit has previously held that the Nevada controlled substance list, at least as incorporated into this Nevada crime, is divisible vis-a-vis the drug possessed. Seems so. Mesica Silos counsel didn't contest the issue, so I'm sure there's a reason, albeit unexplained in this decision. Looking at the conviction docs, we know it's methamphetamine, though, and it looks like an isomer argument wasn't made. Just noting, just noting. The Ninth Circuit holds, however, that this conviction is not divisible as to the actus reus. Quote, an indivisible statute sets out a single set of elements to define a single crime, end quote. If a statute is indivisible, then its overbreath wins the day for the criminal defendant or non-citizen, because that's the end of the analysis. No further inquiry into what a defendant or non-citizen actually did is permitted. Here, section 453.321 makes it a felony for a person to quote, import, transport, sell, exchange, barter, supply, prescribe, dispense, give away, or administer a controlled counterfeit substance. End quote. The Ninth Circuit held that a very similar Nevada statute was indivisible in Villa Vicencio the Sessions from 2018. What do you think is going on with Mr. Sessions, by the way? Haven't thought about him in a while. Why is it indivisible? Well, in that case, as here, the different alternative ways of committing the offense are all punished the same way. What's more, generally in Nevada, a jury may convict without being unanimous as to the underlying means of committing the offense. And quote, any statutory phrase that explicitly or implicitly refers to multiple alternative means of commission must still be regarded as indivisible if the jurors need not agree on which method of committing the offense the defendant used. End quote. So that's powerful stuff. Both that quote and jurors. Defined otherwise here, the district court relied on a non presidential Ninth Circuit decision, which it seems the Ninth Circuit now. Precedentially believes was wrong. But why does all this matter? What about this Nevada statute is overbroad vis-a-vis the sentence enhancement provision? The Ninth Circuit doesn't actually explain. I went back and read it multiple times. And I never do this, but I'm in too deep now, so I went to via Vincencio v sessions for the answer. And you know what? Couldn't find it there either. I promise I'm smart people. But it seems that either I'm missing something, or nowhere in these two decisions is the Ninth Circuit explaining what part of the actus reus of this Nevada offense is broader than a sentence enhancement or immigration controlled substance offense. But if I'm a betting man, I think it's the prescribe, dispense, giveaway, or administer portion. But I really don't know. I feel strange. And as such, I'm not 100% on how far to take this decision. But I do know that Nevada Revised Statute Section 453.3211A is indivisibly not a sentence enhancement controlled substance offense. And based on the reasoning, it seems likely that it's not, at a minimum, an INA section 101A43B drug trafficking aggravated felony either. And that is United States Vicastildo. Registration is now open. The annual Immigration Court Trial Advocacy College convenes every year in April, only in Kansas City, Missouri, hosted by the Pen and Sword, that awesome community resource founded by Rakeah and Michael Sharmacrawford. This year, the program has been reimagined and reworked to address the current climate of aggressive deportation enforcement. These times are not ordinary, so the program had to be extraordinary. Expanding from three to four days, the trial college provides comprehensive training from beginning to end. Real cases taught by real litigators in real courtrooms. The skills you need, the confidence you deserve, and the mentors you look up to all in one place. Register early to avoid disappointment at www.thepen-and-stordk.org or at the special links in the show notes. Use special code ImmigrationReview26 to get $50 off the Trial Advocacy College this year. That's Capital I, Capital R. You know we weren't going to get away from the BIA this week. This is Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, published by the BIA. And it's the BIA's third presidential decision in this exact case. And it's the sixth time by my count that this decision, Valenzuela Gallardo, has been discussed on the podcast. Quite the case. The BIA has been fighting with the Ninth Circuit about this decision for years, but with the Supreme Court having largely ruled against the Ninth Circuit in Pugin, the BIA appears triumphant.

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Valenzuela Gallardo is a lawful permanent resident from Mexico. In 2007, he was convicted of accessory to a felony in violation of Section 32 of the California Penal Code and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. THS alleged, and the BIA has twice held, that that is an aggravated felony crime relating to obstruction of justice, as defined at INA section 11A43S, because it quote, involves one, an affirmative and intentional attempt, two, that is motivated by a specific intent, three, to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, or in another's punishment resulting from a completed proceeding. End quote. Now the Ninth Circuit has twice disagreed about Prong 3, that reasonable, foreseeable investigation thing. But the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in Pugin, episode 165, during an AILA National Conference, if I'm not mistaken. I do recall reading and recording Pugin from a hotel room. Under Pugin, the aggravated felony definition, quote, does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending, end quote. Reasonably foreseeable cuts it. The Ninth Circuit essentially already rolled over on this in Cordero Garcia Vigarla in episode 218. But the BIA has now said it again in its third precedential decision. Namely, the aggravated felony statute describes a state or federal crime that requires, quote, a specific intent offense involving an affirmative and intentional attempt to interfere with the process of justice and law, end quote. In a footnote, the BIA also explains that the Ninth Circuit's initial concerns over the phrase process of justice appear resolved by the Supreme Court not having similar concerns in Pugin. The BIA also holds for the third time that Section 32 of the California Penal Code does qualify as an aggravated felony. Even though an investigation need not be pending when the obstruction occurs, the statute, quote, explicitly requires that the perpetrator act with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment. End quote. This is a sufficient specific purpose for the BIA. What wouldn't cut it? Well, explains the BIA, miss prison of a felony under 18 USC section 4. That does not require a requisite specific intent to interfere with the process of justice in law. Take note. In Fugin, though, notes the BIA. Quote, moreover, the statute's actus reus, the requirement that one who is charged as an accessory have harbored, concealed, or aided a principal in avoiding or escaping from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment for the underlying felony, necessarily involves interference with the process of justice and law. End quote. What a mushy aggravated felony. But all of those things explains the PIA, quote, tend somehow to impair the machinery of the criminal law, end quote, as Pugin requires of the aggravated felony definition.

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Valenzuela Guiardo is removable yet again. And I suspect that's the end of this particular fight. And that is Matter of Valenzuela Guiardo. Continuing, we have Matter of Pellio Mendoza, published by the BIA. This case is about evidentiary sufficiency, published Friday afternoon. Overturning an immigration judge's grant of non-LPR cancellation of removal and ordering the non-citizen removed. Not even remanding.

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Pellaggio Mendoza is a 46-year-old man from Mexico who has three U.S. citizen children. The children will remain in the United States with his ex-wife if he is removed.

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Pellaggio Mendoza is their primary source of income, and he's a good, involved father. The eldest son, who's a teenager, testified that he had thoughts of suicide and struggled psychologically after his parents divorced. That child was deemed credible in immigration court. BIA laments that, quote, the record does not contain non-testimonial or expert opinion evidence about the mental health of the respondent's eldest son, end quote. As I mentioned, the IG granted relief and the BIA isn't here for it. Although, is this even appropriate, BIA? You don't have an attorney general anymore. Do you truly know what Todd Blanche thinks of evidentiary burdens in non-LPR cancellation of removal cases, you voice of the Attorney General, you? Did you even check first? Did you even ask? To find exceptional, extremely unusual hardship required of non-LPR cancellation of removal, quote, the immigration judge must compare the hardship in a given case to the hardship that results in the usual, ordinary course when a non-citizen is removed, end quote. Lots of factors are relevant. Here, the hardship finding was based largely on the mental health of the eldest son. But quote, neither the respondent nor the eldest son's testimony establishes that these past issues are ongoing, that the son is currently in therapy for these issues, or that he has received a formal diagnosis of any mental health condition. End quote. Furthermore, and there's always a furthermore these days, folks, the mental health stuff seems based largely on the divorce. But the BIA doesn't see evidence that removal will make things worse now, well after the divorce.

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Pelagio Mendoza argued below and before the BIA that he didn't submit supporting medical reports for the son given HIPAA rules and concerns. But the BIA doesn't think HIPAA precludes patients or parents of minor patients from obtaining and submitting such records, taking administrative notice of HIPAA regulations. Moreover, and there's always a more over these days, folks, the BIA explains that the respondent, who didn't have the burden on appeal, of course, didn't identify what records existed that were not submitted, or that medical professionals refused giving to him under HIPAA. For your own case, quote, mental health records and expert testimony from medical professionals familiar with the qualifying relative may be probative

Gardner v. Blanche, No. 24-1553 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026)

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and ultimately support an exceptional and extreme unusual hardship determination, end quote. And they should be available. Given this explains the BIA, testimony from the respondent or the qualifying relative themselves about their mental health, diagnosis, and belief of the hardship that will occur, quote, is generally not a sufficient substitute for expert evidence, end quote. Seems like the BIA likes experts now. To the extent the BIA's 2015 decision matter of YSLC can be read otherwise, well, don't read it that way, explains the BIA. Plus, quote, that decision was overbroad and incorrect, end quote. The power this BIA is wielding is truly something to behold and to learn from. As such, the BIA believes the IJ clearly aired, clearly, and the financial hardship stuff was insufficient. Having taken away his cancellation grant and paths to a green card due to what could be readily fixable evidentiary concerns, the BIA declined to remand proceedings for submission of additional evidence and ordered Mr. Bellagio Mendoza removed to Mexico and away from his family. And that is matter of Bellagio Mendoza. Moving on, we have Cardenas, the Attorney General of the United States, published by the Third Circuit on March 31st, 2026. This case is about Violence Against Women Act stuff. And it's a bad story. Mr. Cardenas is from the Dominican Republic and first entered the US without authorization when he was 14 years old in 1999. He lived with his mother, brother, and stepfather. The stepfather abused Mr. Cardenas, his brother, and their mother, violent beatings every day, and what appears to be a close kidnapping. It was terrible, really. Absolutely awful as written.

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Cardenas escaped at 17 or 18 years old. But all of them lacked immigration authorization, including the stepfather. Mr. Cardenas' mother only left the relationship after she got LPR status. Before that, she stayed out of fear that the stepfather would make good on his promise to report her to immigration authorities. Unsure how she got her status, but she didn't. Good for her. But the stepfather continued to quote, terrorize, unquote, the mother and forced her to sponsor his adjustment of status application. She did, and he obtained LPR status. Thereafter, the stepfather threatened Mr. Cardenas on one occasion. After the mother finally conclusively left the stepfather, quote, she was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and PTSD and attempted suicide at least three times, end quote. Mr. Cardenas saved her life at least once and remains his mother's main source of emotional support. When mobile proceedings began in 2019, it seems with this wild footnote.

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Mr.

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Cardenas, quote, was arrested while traveling in Mexico and involuntarily paroled into the United States to face criminal prosecution. All criminal charges against him were dropped, end quote. That's the end that we're going to hear about that, but quite the footnote, right? In a mobile proceedings, he applied for special rule cancellation of removal, follow cancellation, and regular old non-LPR cancellation of removal. Among other things, quote, to show hardship, Mr. Cardenas presented a psychoanalyst who stated that the abuse the mother experienced was the worst she had ever heard, and that the mother would be at greater risk of suicide if Mr. Cardenas were deported because she would experience more cognitive distortions and increased depression. End quote. An immigration judge denied, and the BIA affirmed by split decision. Vowal cancellation was denied because the abusing stepdad wasn't an LPR or U.S. citizen at the time of the abuse, as vowel cancellation requires. And non-LPR cancellation was denied well because the BIA and the IJ didn't think that the hardship to that mother was bad enough. The Third Circuit remanded on the first point, the VAWA stuff. The statute requires that the special rule cancellation applicant establish that he, quote, has been batted or subjected to extreme cruelty by a parent who is or was, end quote, an LPR or U.S. citizen. Other elements too, but they're not at issue here. By the way, step parents totally count under the statute and case law explains the Third Circuit. The plaintext of is or was to the Third Circuit refers, quote, at some point before the application for relief was adjudicated, end quote. It requires that at some point before it was adjudicated, that the abuser, quote, had LPR status, and thus applies even if the abuser lacked that status at the time of abuse, end quote. Getting the status after the abuse, but before the relief application is adjudicated counts. And that's what happened here, right? It also counts if the abuser later loses the LPR status or U.S. citizenship before adjudication, explains the Third Circuit. The court believes this alliance with an Eighth Circuit decision and an unpublished BIA decision. Now, unfortunately, the BIA published matter of LLP in 2021, episode 146, and came to the opposite conclusion. Not worth much to the Third Circuit. Not least of which because the Third Circuit believes that the BIA simply got the plain text wrong, as well as, quote, basic rules of grammar, end quote. The use of the word is, in particular, connotes a present tense inquiry rather than past tense. Not even a citation to Loper Bread, although I guess not needed. Plain text will always win, even under Chevron Deference. And it all means that it's going back for other vowel cancellation element adjudication, including but not limited to whether Mr. Cardanas' removal will cause extreme hardship to him or his mother. That's different from the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

Petrov v. Blanche, No. 20-3517 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026)

SPEAKER_00

standard for non-LPR cancellation, both because of the heightened standard and because of who can qualify. And it's a good thing too because the Third Circuit affirmed denial of that. It's reviewable post-Wilkinson, but that review is deferential. To the Third Circuit, the agency did consider the increased risk of suicide and mental decompensation, that experts and the evidence show the mother risks. So the failure to consider that evidence, that argument, that's out, explains the court. Then, in true legal ease, that deferential circuit review sometimes leads to, quote, the IGA recognized the mother's trauma, but concluded that she one would receive adequate mental health support from her husband, children, and other family members, two, works full-time, and three, no longer fears the ex-husband. The BIA reasonably concluded that these changed circumstances mitigated the mental health consequences Mr. Cardanius' deportation would cause. We do not minimize the severity of the mother's terrible experience, but the evidence in the record does not compel a conclusion that other than that reached by the BIA, that Mr. Cardanias' removal would not cause the mother extremely unusual hardship. End quote. But it might be extreme hardship. Let's see on remand. And for that, congratulations to Harmon P. Singh and Andrew D. Silverman from a law firm giving pro bono representation, as well as Zoe Jones and Edward M. McCarthy from the Brooklyn Defender Services. They got a partial win, and a likely more important one as well. And that is Cardanis, the Attorney General of the United States. Not sure what to do when a client asks you about the EB5 investor visa or how they can choose the right EB5 project? That's where EB5 Support comes in. Founded and led by veteran immigration attorney Irena Pristova, EB5 Support helps investors navigate the entire process of EB5 project selection and provides complementary training for immigration attorneys who want to strengthen their EB5 petition filing skills. Visit eB5Support.com. That's eB5 support.com. Or click on the link in the show notes. Access their online attorney portal for training tools and practical resources, or schedule a time to speak with the team. All project guidance is provided by FINRA registered financial professionals so you and your clients can proceed with confidence. EB5 Support, where immigration law meets investment expertise. Security is offered for sequence financial specialists. Doing business has Invest America. You didn't go to law school to enter data. I know I didn't. Yet here you are. H 1B season in full swing, and your team is buried in beneficiary forms, document chasing, and data entry. That's $400 an hour in legal talent doing $20 an hour work. Staffi plugs directly into your workflow. Staffi handles the data entry, document collection, and H1B form prep. Your team reviews it, you approve it, you bill. With the new wage-weighted selection process adding even more admin pressure this season, the firms that scale are the ones that stop doing it all themselves. Say yes to more H1B clients without burning out your team. Visit staffy.cc or call 786-891-5619 or click on the special link in the show notes. Because you deserve a practice that grows without burning you out. Next is Kijano Duran B. Bondi, published by the Eighth Circuit on April 2nd, 2026. This case is about asylum, but really, due process and ICE enforcement authority. Miss Kijano is from El Salvador and filed for asylum based on a fear of the Mara 18 criminal organization. They threatened to kidnap and commit violence on her and her family and extorted the family. An immigration judge denied the asylum application, believing her testimony inconsistent with other testimony and evidence, but that in any event she didn't supper pass persecution, and extortion didn't provide a nexus to a cognizable protected ground. Plus, insufficient showing of unable and willing to protect, or that she couldn't relocate. Really, the whole shebang. On appeal to the BIA, Ms. Kijano, of course, challenged the denial on the merits, but also argued, quote, she was denied due process because the IJ prejudged her hearing testimony, evidencing unconstitutional judicial bias, end quote. The BIA disagreed and in fact believed Ms. Kajano waived the bias argument, and then of course affirmed on the merits. The Eighth Circuit did too. Although the merits of the asylum denial weren't challenged before the Eighth Circuit. So this is all about that judicial bias stuff.

unknown

And Ms.

SPEAKER_00

Kajano apparently made the due process and judicial bias argument briefly in the notice of appeal, but she never elaborated on it in her BIA briefs. That's where the waiver really comes in. Not true, explains the Eighth Circuit. She actually cited portions of the hearing transcript in her notice of appeal that she alleged showed bias. I'm not sure how

United States v. Gonzalez-Reyes, No. 23-3532 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026)

SPEAKER_00

that's even possible given that transcripts aren't produced until well after a notice of appeal is filed, but that's what the Eighth Circuit says happened. Footnote 5 of Matter of ORE from 2021 apparently holds that the BIA can deem an argument waived that was mentioned in a notice of appeal but not developed later. And the Eighth Circuit agrees with that. Matter of Valencia from 1986 also supports that, and it's actually getting worse here. The Eighth Circuit seems to be holding that the notice of appeal statements on this issue were too conclusory. I hope the court is. Only so relaying and stating to hold that the notice of appeal was insufficient without an appellate brief elaborating rather than holding that the notice of appeal was somehow deficient in and of itself. Because the Eighth Circuit does go on to explain how the actual brief, in addition to the notice of appeal, didn't elaborate on key issues or anything really showing judicial bias or prejudice necessary for any due process claim, as we keep talking about this episode. In fact, due process isn't mentioned at all in the BIA brief, explains the court. The Eighth Circuit concludes by rejecting Ms. Gijano's argument that DHS shouldn't have pursued her removability at all. And I suppose that the IJ shouldn't have ordered her removed because she wasn't a DHS enforcement priority at the time. The Eighth Circuit held that it lacks jurisdiction to consider whether DHS is properly exercising its prosecutorial discretion. And that's that. Careful with this one and how it risks heightening the standard for notices of appeal to the BIA. And that is Kajano Duran B. Bondi. We conclude with Deck V. Mullen, published by the Seventh Circuit on March 30th, 2026. Nothing to celebrate about this bad boy, but a few things to note. First, we have our inaugural appearance of Mark Wayne Mullen on the podcast. I enjoy saying his name so much that I think I will say the full name whenever he appears going forward. In fact, I did it in the episode preview. And second, well, in addition to an important jurisdictional holding, we have the first documented precedential use of AI in the immigration world. Not great. Not great. Mstek is from Poland and has been living in America without authorization for a long time. Her sister was a U.S. citizen and filed an I-130 petition for her in 2008 or 2009. It was approved in 2009. Nearly 20 years ago, right? Because sibling petitions are so delayed that actually using an approved petition can take decades. The priority date takes decades to become current sometimes. I don't know when this sister petition became current, but I'm sure it took many years.

unknown

Ms.

SPEAKER_00

Dick has another problem though. She needs a form I-601A waiver of her unlawful presence. Either she came to the United States without authorization many years ago, and or it doesn't matter because she's attempting a non-immediate relative adjustment, right? So she needs the consular process. But the second she leaves the US, she's barred for 10 years. So she needs a 601A. Even worse, U.S. citizen siblings aren't qualifying relatives for 601As. Only U.S. citizen or LPR parents or spouses are. And Miss Dick had one of those, her LPR mother. But the mother passed away in 2020. Possibly while waiting for the I-130 priority date to become current. Immigration's easy, right, folks? Easy stuff. So now Miss Deck is kind of screwed. Maybe not. Seems that INA section 204L would have potentially allowed this. That is, benefiting from and perhaps even receiving a waiver based on a deceased relative. That is, and at a minimum, if the mother was the petitioner. But she wasn't. The sister was, recall? As such, USCIS denied the 601A waiver application for lack of qualifying relative. Out of options, Ms. Deck sued in district court. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and here the Seventh Circuit affirmed that. As so often occurs, the issue to the Seventh Circuit is that I-601As are just too discretionary. The ultimate decision to waive inadmissibility is expressly committed to the agency's quote sole discretion, end quote, explains the seventh. While threshold eligibility is still sometimes reviewable in federal court for similar waivers and relief, this statutory waiver also requires a showing, quote, to the satisfaction of the Attorney General, end quote, or something similar. That's INA section 212A9B V. To the Seventh Circuit, that distinguishes unlawful presence 601A hardship waivers from, say, the non-LPR cancellation of removal reviewability issue from Wilkinson. Heck, the Supreme Court itself made that distinction, explain to the court that USCIS incorporates INA section 204L into the calculus when a qualifying relative dies, doesn't change this statutory text-based analysis. And in any event, that policy too, that's at USCIS's discretion. Not to mention the waiver statute itself has a jurisdiction-stripping provision. Quote, no court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the agency regarding a waiver, end quote. Pretty big problem. And using logic similar to the Supreme Court's in Patel, the Seventh Circuit held that that means that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review, quote, any decision relating to a waiver application, including threshold eligibility determinations. End quote. That is a form I-601A is pretty brutal. Plus, there's no jurisdictional savings clause for district court review, as there is for petitions for review. Taken together, explains the Seventh Circuit, Miss Deck has no claim. Quote, no review means no review. End quote. Now the Seventh Circuit does know that Miss Deck can still seek federal court review if placed in removal proceedings, and if she then loses at the IJ and BIA level, and then she petitions for review. But of course, that is many years away, and it's at DHS's discretion to begin, and it will cost so, so much money. And it might involve Miss Deck being detained, and perhaps, most importantly to me, cannot actually provide Miss Deck a path to challenge the denial of an I-601A because immigration judges lack authority to grant them. But the INE is filled with seemingly unfair frameworks. Much of that was all me. But I think it's true. Having lost on the merits, that was not the end of this decision. There's the AI chat GPT stuff. Miss Dex cited two cases in her opening brief that do not exist. What's more, she relayed, quote, an imaginary quotation, end quote. God, this is terrible. Quote, such errors have telltale signs of AI hallucinations, in which an AI large language model generates a fictional or inaccurate output, end quote. Miss Dex Counsel could not explain this at oral argument when asked, and denied using AI. Though when pressed, she did apologize. And in a post-oral argument letter, Miss Dex Counsel reiterated that she didn't use AI and doesn't even know how to. Perhaps she opined it was a poor copy-paste job from something else. She completely accepted the responsibility, though, as a member of the bar as one should. And at the time she prepared the brief, apparently her firm had dramatically expanded and caseload was an issue. I believe her, and I think the Seventh Circuit does too. The Seventh Circuit is not pleased, including at Oil, which also didn't catch this, explains the court. Reviewing it all, the Seventh Circuit admonished Miss Deck's counsel, quote, this opinion should be read to impress upon her and the bar the importance of honesty and vigilance in checking the accuracy of all citations and quotes. End quote. The Seventh Circuit notes that apparently you can put your brief through Lexus or Westlaw and it will literally check the accuracy of your quotes and citations. Pretty interesting. Quote, we are persuaded by her acceptance of responsibility and sincere apology that these false citations were not made knowingly or intentionally. Moreover, because these errors were few and mainly supported the undisputed standard of review, we find her representation that she did not use AI plausible. End quote. But my God, be careful, people. Look up every case you cite, or this is inevitable. You can't trust anyone, including your associates, your interns, your paralegals, or apparently even yourself and your old briefs. Back to Miss Deck, then she did not succeed. And that is Deck the Mark Wayne Mullen. So there you have it. You're all caught up with the past week's published immigration cases. I'm Kevin A. Gregg, a partner with the law firm Kurzban, Kurzban Titselli, and Pratt, and this has been another episode of Immigration Review. Thank you for listening and I hope you enjoyed it. If you did, please share it with a friend and rate and review us. Each review helps new listeners find the show. And of course, subscribe to Immigration Review wherever you get your podcasts. If you like what we do and want to become a patron of the show, please check out our Patreon page at www.patreon.com forward slash immigration review or click on the link in the show notes. And if you're interested in an official Immigration Review CLE certificate, email me at kgreg at kktplaw.com with your full name and the episode numbers for the 10 shows you've listened to. Also, feel free to email me with questions, comments, or anything at all. And follow the show on Instagram and Facebook at Immigration Review or send us a tweet at Imreview. That's IMM Review. And you know we're always interested in hearing listener feedback. Like this review about the episode you just listened to from my very young son. Son, how did you like that episode? Indeed. If you like my son, enjoyed what you just heard again, please give the Patreon pager some love, feel free to review the pod, reach out to me with your own kind sounds, or do anything else nice that your heart desires. I'll be back next week for a brand new discussion. Until then, I'm Kevin A. Gregg, bringing you the Immigration Review.